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IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION STANDARDS TO 
IMPROVE AFGHANISTAN’S EDUCATION SYSTEM 
Adam J. Centner 
Education is central to every country’s growth and sustainability, 
but it is particularly important in a war-torn and developing nation like 
Afghanistan. The education sector in Afghanistan has made drastic strides 
since the overthrow of the Taliban government. Now, its biggest obstacle is 
no longer the lack of students or funds, but rather the culture of corruption 
that runs rampant in all aspects of Afghan life. From bribery to pilfered 
paychecks, corruption destroys government credibility, wastes money, and 
undermines the rule of law. This Note examines the United Nations       
Convention Against Corruption and various international best practices to 
investigate, prevent, prosecute, and educate against corruption. In         
Afghanistan’s education sector, corruption will never be completely      
eradicated, but it can be managed. Afghanistan’s future depends on it. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Afghanistan is at a pivotal moment. After decades of instability and 
warfare, the future of this war-torn country relies on today’s policies and 
initiatives. Involvement from both the Afghan government and the         
international community is crucial. 
  
  Managing Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law; B.A. Miami 
University (2008); J.D. Case Western Reserve University School of Law (2012). I would like 
to thank Prof. Michael Scharf for his guidance throughout the writing of this Note and my 
family and friends for their continued support. 
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Education may be the most vital of these policies and initiatives. 
Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s national education system is tragically       
corrupt, depriving millions of school-aged children of the opportunity to 
learn. Imagine being a teacher and having to pay a bribe for your paycheck. 
Imagine being a parent and having to pay a bribe for your child to receive a 
passing grade. Imagine being an employer and being unable to decipher 
between the authentic diplomas and the counterfeit replicas. 
Without suppressing the rampant corruption that currently plagues 
Afghanistan, its educational goals will continue to go unmet, stripping the 
country of its most vital resource: educated children. A poor education   
system will severely cripple Afghanistan’s future growth and development, 
both socially and economically. Education is only one part of an extremely 
corrupt national governmental infrastructure in Afghanistan .1 In January 
2010, Afghan President Hamid Karzai ordered all government ministries, 
including the Ministry of Education (MoE), to devise detailed and          
independent anti-corruption strategies.2 
This Note will analyze how the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC) can be better implemented to reduce corruption in 
Afghanistan’s education system. Specifically, it will discuss various anti-
corruption programs implemented in other countries and will consider how 
Afghanistan’s MoE can benefit from the lessons learned and successes 
achieved in the international community, as well as potential steps the MoE 
can take to reduce corruption.   
This Note is divided into three main parts. It begins with a glimpse 
of the history of Afghanistan’s education system and its current state, as 
well as the importance of a solid, functioning national education program, 
particularly in such a war-torn and developing nation. Next, it examines the 
impact that corruption has had on the education system and how it plays a 
role in weakening the governmental infrastructure. This is followed by a 
discussion of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, as well as 
current Afghan anti-corruption policies. This section also discusses ideas—
some already being implemented and some new—for battling corruption 
  
 1 See BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA’S WARS 218–19 (2010). It is well-documented that Af-
ghanistan’s government, from top to bottom, is extraordinarily corrupt. U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates said Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his government are “way 
beyond the pale in terms of corruption.” Id. at 219. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl 
Eikenberry said that the international coalition led by the United States is “dealing with an 
extraordinarily corrupt government.” Id. at 218.   
 2 Ministry of Education Drafts Anti-Corruption Policy, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. 
(Mar. 15, 2010) [hereinafter MoE Drafts Policy], available at http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en 
/USAID/Article/1066/Ministry_of_Education_Drafts_Anticorruption_Policy. The Ministry 
of Education drafted its anti-corruption policy throughout much of 2010. As of the date of 
this Note, the policy is under review and not publicly available. Many have speculated, how-
ever, on the issues and solutions it will address, and much of that is discussed in this Note. 
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within the education sector. Finally, the Note explores different potential 
solutions for Afghanistan and the international community to take to reduce 
the effect of corruption and stabilize the national education system. 
II. EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN 
The importance of education in a society cannot be overstated. A 
functioning and stable education system is a boon to progress, especially in 
a struggling and transforming country. A core goal of Afghanistan’s MoE is 
to develop a system that can serve as a cornerstone to peace, stability,    
democracy, poverty reduction, and economic growth.3 A good education 
program not only helps stabilize and grow a society, but it is also a key  
ingredient in the fight against violent extremism. 
A strong Afghanistan in the future requires a strong education    
system today. The median age in Afghanistan is eighteen years: the country 
has one of the youngest populations on the planet.4 It also has one of the 
highest illiteracy rates in the world, with nearly three out of four people 
unable to read or write.5 With this comes a vicious cycle: if so few members 
of the population are literate, who is going to teach the children? Despite the 
alarming numbers, though, Afghanistan’s education system has come a long 
way in just ten years. 
Education has never been particularly strong in Afghanistan, as    
instability and religious priorities have made traditional schooling difficult.6 
However, Afghanistan’s education system has never been as strong as it is 
now, either. In the last century, Afghanistan’s education sector has       
transformed from nonexistence into a developing infrastructure, then back 
to near nonexistence. Today, it has become a rapidly growing, but still 
flawed system. To understand how and why Afghanistan’s education     
system is what it is today, it is important to start at the beginning. 
  
 3 Mohammad Haneef Atmar, Minister of Educ., Message from the Minister in MINISTRY 
OF EDUC., ISLAMIC REPUB. AFG., NAT’L EDUCATION STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AFGHANISTAN: 
1385–1389, at 9–10 (2007), available at http://www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user 
_upload/News_And_Events/pdf/2010/Afghanistan_NESP.pdf. The late Richard Holbrooke, a 
special advisor to President Barack Obama on Afghanistan, in a meeting with the president, 
stressed that the United States should have three priorities in Afghanistan: agriculture, educa-
tion, and reduction of poppies. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 239. 
 4 The World Factbook: Afghanistan, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/af.html (last updated May 8, 2012). The life expectancy in Afghanistan 
is only slightly more than 44 years. Id.  
 5 Id.  
 6 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF NGOS IN EMERGENCIES: 
AFGHANISTAN 1978–2002, at 2–5 (2006) [hereinafter USAID] (describing the impact of the 
Soviet occupation and later Taliban rule on education). 
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In 1904, the first government-supported boys school was built in 
Kabul, Afghanistan;7 the first all-girls school was built in 1921.8 The      
following year, Afghanistan’s MoE, still the entity overseeing national   
education today, was created with the goal of building “a national system of 
schools with a modern curriculum.”9 For years, Afghanistan seemed to be 
on the right path: schools operated in every province, and additional schools 
existed for the country’s nomadic population.10 Without question, there 
were still not enough teachers, resources, or school buildings to              
accommodate all of Afghanistan’s educational needs, but the progress was 
undeniable.11 
During this time, Afghanistan instituted more modernized laws,   
including less-restrictive dress codes for women and equal rights for all.12 
While this progressive reform was good for education, it also stirred up  
opponents and it wasn’t long before the modernization came to a screeching 
halt.13 In 1929, a change in government drastically altered Afghanistan’s 
educational agenda: government schooling was considered “unreligious,” 
leading children to become “infidels.”14 For the next twenty years, education 
reform in Afghanistan went nowhere. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, Afghanistan’s government renewed its 
commitment to education. Education spending increased dramatically,  
  
 7 Id. at 2.  
 8 Mir Hekmatullah Sadat, Modern Education in Afghanistan, AFGHAN MAG. (Mar. 2004), 
http://www.afghanmagazine.com/2004_03/articles/education.shtml. The first girls school 
was created by Queen Soraya, whose mother served as the first principal. By 1928, the 
school had educated more than 800 girls. In that same year, Afghanistan’s first co-
educational elementary school opened. Though progress was being made at the elementary 
level, no formal system existed for higher education and many top graduates were sent to 
study in Egypt, Germany, and France. Id.  
 9 RICHARD NEWELL, THE POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN 54 (1972).    
 10 Sadat, supra note 8.   
 11 See Afghanistan Education History, SCHOOL IS OPEN, http://www.schoolisopen.org/sio/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=62 (last visited May 15, 
2012) (explaining the expansion of an educational system during the mid-20th century, de-
spite the challenges of changing government leadership and access to resources). Much of 
the progress was made in the larger cities, especially Kabul. Though it was a good step for 
Afghanistan, no formal schooling existed for many children living in remote villages. The 
infrastructure was growing, but it was not yet at the point where the system could spread 
throughout the country. Unfortunately, it would never get to that point in the 20th century. Id.  
 12 See BARRY YOUNGERMAN & SHAISTA WEBB, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 106 
(2007) (describing the advent of a new constitution in 1923, which, among other protections, 
provided equal rights for non-Muslims and explicitly guaranteed women’s rights).  
 13 Id. at 109 (noting that uprisings against the government lead the king to dramatically 
reverse course on his reform plans). 
 14 Sadat, supra note 8.   
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eventually comprising more than 40% of the country’s national budget.15 
Afghanistan sought assistance for education programs from international 
organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and several countries.16 While the      
renewed focus was certainly positive, the numbers were still                   
underwhelming. By 1950, only 6% of children from age six to twelve were 
enrolled in primary education.17 
By the time the Soviet Union invaded in 1978, the gross enrollment 
rate for all school-aged children attending classes had risen to 54% for 
males and 12% for females.18 However, with the invasion came the fighting, 
and in the next several decades an estimated 80% of the country’s school 
buildings were destroyed.19 After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 
1989, many expected education to improve, but the opposite occurred.20 
After decades of war, the system was unable to grow, instead crumpling 
from the continued fighting of different Mujahedeen factions grappling for 
control, leading to the destruction of many more roads and schools.21 
In 1996, the Taliban acquired control and quickly terminated all 
modernized educational institutions in Afghanistan.22 The extremist       
government banned girls from school and women from teaching, effectively 
setting Afghanistan’s education system back almost a full century.23 
When the Taliban government was officially overthrown in late 
2001, there were less than one million school-aged children attending    
  
 15 Id.  
 16 See SAIF R. SAMADY, U.N. EDUC., SCI., & CULTURAL ORG., EDUCATION AND AFGHAN 
SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16 (2001) (describing UNESCO’s role in developing 
education infrastructure and programs and other nation’s support for Afghan education via 
advisory roles).  
 17 Sadat, supra note 8.  
 18 USAID, supra note 6, at 3. At this same time, the literacy rate was 18% for males and 
5% for females. Sadat, supra note 8.  
 19 USAID, supra note 6, at 3. 
 20 See Leigh Nolan, Afghanistan, Education, and the Formation of the Taliban 18–20 (Jan. 
2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Tufts University) (describing the failure of various anti-
Soviet factions to unite and provide any meaningful leadership after Soviet withdrawal). 
During the Soviet era, there were two types of schools: pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet. The for-
mer created institutions designed to educate Afghan children on Communism and the Soviet 
way of life. The anti-Soviet schools focused on traditional Afghan teachings. As time passed, 
this branch became increasingly religious-based, focusing on Muslim teachings and preach-
ing against foreign occupation. This extremist-type of schooling played a critical role in the 
years following the Soviet withdrawal. Id. at 15–18. 
 21 See id. at 18–20   
 22 USAID, supra note 6, at 4. 
 23 Id.   
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classes.24 Today, there are more than 6.8 million children enrolled in school, 
including 2.5 million girls.25  
Undoubtedly, Afghanistan’s education sector has seen many      
tangible and impressive successes over the last decade. Yet roughly half of 
the country’s school-aged children remain out of school. Only 25% of the 
country’s approximately 160,000 teachers have a high school education,26 
and even fewer are well versed in more than one subject and have the ability 
to transfer that knowledge to the students: a recent survey found that only 
ten out of 200 teachers (5%) could pass the exact same exam they were  
giving their students.27 
III. A WAY OF LIFE: CORRUPTION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR 
While education has vastly improved in the last several years, it still 
has a long way to go. Unfortunately, systemic corruption threatens not only 
the progress that has been made in the education system, but also the future 
of Afghanistan itself. 
For the purposes of this Note, corruption is defined as “the abuse of 
trusted power for private gain.”28 Corruption in the government             
compromises security, development and state building.29 In Afghanistan, it 
is contributing to the deterioration of public confidence in the government 
and the resurgence of the Taliban.30 In the education sector specifically, 
  
 24 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 219 (2010). At this same time, there were only 
3,400 school buildings, the majority of which were unusable, and 20,000 teachers. AGENCY 
COORDINATING BODY FOR AFGHAN RELIEF, HEALTH AND EDUCATION IN AFGHANISTAN: AN 
EMPTY GIFT 9 (2011) [hereinafter ACBAR]. 
 25 ACBAR, supra note 24, at 9.  
 26 Ben Arnoldy, Big Test for Afghanistan Education, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 13, 
2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1113/p06s17-wosc.html. 
 27 OXFAM, FREE, QUALITY EDUCATION FOR EVERY AFGHAN CHILD 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/Free,%20Quality%20Education%20for%2
0Every%20Afghan%20Child.pdf. 
 28 Anti-Corruption FAQs, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/ 
organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/ (last visited May 15, 2012). 
 29 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., ASSESSMENT OF CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2009) 
[hereinafter CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT]. In a report to then-President George W. Bush, Army 
Lieutenant General Douglas Lute wrote that U.S. interests in Afghanistan hinge on three 
goals: curtailing corruption, controlling the out-of-control opium trade, and destroying Tali-
ban and al-Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 43–44. In July 2009, 
General Stanley McChrystal echoed this sentiment, arguing that the military “could run the 
finest counterinsurgency campaign in world history and still fail because of the weak and 
corrupt Afghan government.” Id. at 151. 
 30 Dexter Filkins, Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2009, at A1. The article also noted quite eloquently, “From the lowliest traffic policeman to 
the family of President Hamid Karzai, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government 
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corruption results in the payment of sixteen to twenty thousand ghost  
teachers.31 In addition, teachers grade many students not on their own    
performance or ability, but on arbitrary factors, including familial relations 
and the family’s ability to pay a bribe.32 Largely due to their inadequate 
salaries, many teachers rely on these bribes to feed their own families.33 
Moreover, because of the poor organizational system and lack of 
technology in the MoE, many teachers are not paid in a timely manner or 
are forced to pay a bribe themselves to receive their own paycheck.34      
Additionally, one cannot overlook the effect that corruption has directly on 
children, especially when they grow up in an environment where corruption 
is not only tolerated, but is a way of life. When it comes to implementing 
anti-corruption programs, the battle lies in changing the culture of          
corruption that undermines government at all levels. Theoretically, if     
corruption is strongly condemned, public acceptance of corruption will  
decline, thus establishing the beginning of a successful long-term, anti-
corruption strategy.  
In addition to corruption’s direct effects on education, corruption 
also deters and distorts private investment and erodes the functioning,   
credibility, and legitimacy of the government.35 Transparency International, 
an international watchdog organization that monitors corruption around the 
globe, ranked Afghanistan as the third most corrupt country in the world in 
2011, the most recent year for which data is available.36 Even worse, corrup-
  
seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who 
run it.” Id.  
 31 MORTEN SIGSGAARD, U.N. EDUC., SCI., AND CULTURAL ORG., EDUCATION AND 
FRAGILITY IN AFGHANISTAN: A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 23 (2009). Ghost teachers are those 
who do not show up to work but continue to collect a paycheck or those who are doubly 
registered and collect two paychecks for a single job. Id.  
 32 See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 7 (describing how relationships among 
individuals in the public and individuals in government have more authority than actual 
government regulations).  
 33 Id. at 8.  
 34 See id. at 6 (explaining how the MoE is beginning to address how teachers must pay 
bribes to receive pay checks and performance evaluations). 
 35 Asian Dev. Bank, U.K. Dep’t for Int’l Dev., U.N. Dev. Programme, U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime & The World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A Roadmap for 
Strategy and Action 1 (Discussion Draft, Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf. 
 36 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (2012). Afghanistan was tied 
for third worst with Myanmar; the essentially government-less Somalia was rated the world’s 
most corrupt country. Transparency International ranked 182 nations based on the perception 
of corruption in the public sector. The results reflect a compilation of several (four in Af-
ghanistan) relevant surveys and assessments from reputable international institutions and 
watch-groups. Afghanistan received an Index score of 1.5. By comparison, New Zealand 
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tion continues to grow: the same Transparency International survey in 2005 
ranked Afghanistan 117th out of 180 countries, and more recently has 
plummeted to 180th out of 182 countries.37 A 2010 survey found that 15% of 
Afghans believe the MoE is one of the three most corrupt public institutions 
in the country, up from 12% in 2007.38 Additionally, 10% of Afghans    
surveyed said that corruption deprived them or their children of a primary or 
secondary education.39 While paying bribes for an education is not as  
common as paying for police or court services, the bribes paid to obtain 
educational services were usually among the highest.40 For the households 
that paid education bribes, the average amount paid was 10,925 Afs per 
year, about U.S. $218.41 
Why does corruption occur in the education system? First, it is   
important to note that in just over a decade the number of children attending 
schools in Afghanistan has increased from about one million to almost   
seven million, and the number of teachers has jumped from 20,000 to 
160,000.42 These increases would be quite significant for any system to  
absorb, but they are particularly cumbersome in an already weak            
infrastructure. Moreover, in a more-developed nation, where technological 
tools are more readily available, the strains of such an enrollment increase 
might not be as harsh. However, in Afghanistan, most teachers and schools, 
and certainly the MoE, lack the ability to update quickly. For example, until 
recently the government paid all teacher salaries in cash. As one would  
expect, this process had several steps, with money flowing from the MoE to 
provincial offices to district offices to individual schools and finally to the 
individual teacher.43 It was not uncommon for the intermediaries to siphon 
  
claimed the top spot for the least corrupt country with an Index score of 9.5, followed by 
Denmark and Finland with scores of 9.4. Id.  
 37 Id. 
 38 INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION: A 
NATIONAL SURVEY 30 (2010). Interestingly, several public institutions, including the Minis-
try of Interior, banks, courts, and municipalities decreased in their perceived level of corrup-
tion. Id. The largest difference occurred in the Courts, where 53% of Afghans rated them one 
of the most corrupt in 2007, but only 18% held the same view in 2010. Id. The Ministry of 
Justice and Ministry of Defense were the largest increases in perceived corruption, raising 13 
and 16 points, respectively, between 2007 and 2010. Id. 
 39 Id. at 64–65. The same survey also found that 76% of Afghans felt they had not been 
deprived of education because of a corrupt government, while 13% were unsure. Id. 
 40 Id. at 68.  
 41 Id. By comparison, the average bribe for other public services is U.S. $160. In 2009, the 
U.N. estimated that Afghans paid U.S. $2.5 billion in bribes across the board, equaling al-
most 23% of the country’s GDP and making corruption the second largest income generator 
in Afghanistan behind only the opium trade. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY AS REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 4 (2010). 
 42 Arnoldy, supra note 26.   
 43 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 41.  
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off money at each step.44 The MoE has recently improved its direct-deposit 
system for teachers, thereby allowing money to go straight from the       
Ministry into individual bank accounts.45 However, these advancements 
have only been accessible to teachers in larger cities, particularly Kabul.46 
Many teachers in outlying villages and regions don’t have access to this 
type of technology, or even bank accounts.47 
The incentives to solicit bribers are particularly great for teachers. 
Afghanistan’s teachers are some of the lowest paid in the world, making 
approximately U.S. $100 per month.48 Couple this with the fact that there is 
minimal oversight and accountability, it is apparent that teachers have little 
to fear and much to gain through bribery. 
Additionally, the MoE lacks information regarding teachers. This is 
due to the influx of new teachers and the MoE’s inability to keep up in the 
past decade, evidenced by the number of ghost teachers in the country and 
the Ministry’s general lack of knowledge about many of its educators.49 
IV. A GLOBAL SOLUTION TO A GLOBAL PROBLEM: THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION 
Corruption only occurs when a public official expects to derive a 
net positive benefit from the transaction. Accordingly, a successful anti-
  
 44 Id.   
 45 Id.  
 46 Id. According to USAID, the agency is currently working with the Central Bank of 
Afghanistan, to develop direct deposit systems for the military and police. Id. When re-
sources become more readily available, the agency hopes to expand this program to more 
civil servants in non-urban areas. See also Faster Payment for Afghan Civil Servants, U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (May 15, 2010), http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/ Arti-
cle/1166/Faster_Payment_for_Afghan_Civil_Servants. 
 47 See The World Bank, Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review 2010: Education Sector 
11–12 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5, 2010), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/AFGHANISTANEXTN/Resources/305984-1264608805475/6739619-12768 
13833351/Paper5.pdf (noting that challenges remain in streamlining direct deposit for teach-
ers). One of the steps the MoE is taking to combat corruption and low wages is to require 
teachers to open bank accounts. While this is not a problem for some, others must travel long 
distances to do so, which would also require them to travel to collect their paychecks. Abbas 
Daiyar, Teacher’s Day in Afghanistan, KABUL PERSPECTIVE BLOG, (May 23, 2009, 10:09 
PM), http://www.kabulperspective.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/teachers-day-in-afghanistan/. 
 48 Arnoldy, supra note 26.  
 49 Cf. Jonathon Burch, Afghan Census Postponed for Two Years: UN, REUTERS (June 8, 
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/08/us-afghan-census-idUSISL267420080608 
(noting that policy makers have insufficient and unreliable data and therefore struggle to 
properly allocate government funds and international aid). In 2008, the country’s first census 
since 1979 was postponed due to poor security and the potential of the 2009 presidential 
election politicizing the event and jeopardizing its statistical integrity. The census was re-
scheduled for 2010, but at the time of this Note, no census statistics were available. Id.  
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corruption program would lower the expected gains and raise the expected 
penalties of corrupt behavior. If the costs—or potential costs—were to  
outweigh the expected gain, officials would be hesitant to engage in corrup-
tion. In an attempt to combat such a global problem and alter the cost-
benefit calculations that may favor corruption, the international community 
has devised a multi-faceted framework to target corruption at its roots and 
punish those who engage in it.  
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) was 
entered into force on December 14, 2005, and is the first and only legally 
binding international anti-corruption treaty.50 UNCAC acknowledges the 
negative effects of corruption, noting that corruption leads to human rights 
violations, distorts markets, allows organized crime and terrorism to     
flourish, and undermines democracy and the rule of law.51 Afghanistan 
signed the Convention in 2004 and ratified it in August 2008.52 This was a 
significant step for Afghanistan, but much remains to be done. 
 
The Convention’s stated goals are:  
(a) [t]o promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat            
corruption more efficiently and effectively;  
(b) [t]o promote, facilitate and support international cooperation and   
technical assistance in the prevention of and fight against corruption, 
including in asset recovery; and 
(c) [t]o promote integrity, accountability and proper management of public 
affairs and public property.53 
  
 50 The Global Compact and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. GLOBAL 
COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/un_agencies/Unit 
ed_Nations_Office_on_Drugs.html (last visited May 16, 2012). 
 51 Kofi Annan, U.N. Secretary-General, Foreword to U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, 
U.N. Convention Against Corruption (2004), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf. 
 52 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, U.S. RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN 
AFGHANISTAN WOULD BENEFIT FROM A FINALIZED COMPREHENSIVE U.S. ANTI-CORRUPTION 
STRATEGY 2 (2010) [hereinafter FINALIZED STRATEGY], available at http://www.sigar.mil/ 
pdf/audits/2010-08-05audit-10-15.pdf. 
 53 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4, Annex, 
art. 1 (Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter UNCAC]. The Convention has 140 signatories. United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, http://www. 
unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited May 16, 2012). It is lauded in 
the international community for being the first international anti-corruption instrument with 
an asset recovery provision, often considered a key ingredient lacking in other anti-
corruption strategies. See Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corrup-
tion, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191, 206–12 (describing the focus on asset recovery during UNCAC 
drafting and debates).  
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To meet these ends, UNCAC relies on four pillars: prevention, 
criminalization, international cooperation, and asset recovery.54 Combating 
corruption in the education sector cannot focus solely on the education   
sector. It is not possible to rid one Ministry of corruption while it occurs in 
epidemic proportions throughout the rest of the government. Accordingly, 
adhering to the provisions of UNCAC will enable Afghanistan to strive for 
and achieve four main goals in combating corruption: (1) improving    
transparency and accountability in government institutions; (2) improving 
financial oversight; (3) building judicial capacity to investigate, prosecute, 
punish, and remove corrupt officials; and (4) aiding organizations in      
educating and empowering the public to participate in good governance.55 
Accomplishing these four goals will greatly reduce corruption in            
Afghanistan, and UNCAC is the first international convention to establish a 
comprehensive framework for doing just that. 
A.  Prevention: Ending the Culture of Corruption 
The first pillar, prevention, is a comprehensive set of requirements 
aimed not only at deterring corruption before it occurs, but also at changing 
the culture of corruption in a society through transparency and public     
participation.56 Afghanistan has recently established three organizations to 
prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption: (1) the High Office of   
Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOOAC); (2) the Major Crimes Task Force 
(MCTF); and (3) the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU). 
The HOOAC, discussed in detail below, is the unifying                
organization tasked with overseeing the government-wide anti-corruption 
efforts, including complaint follow-up, investigation, and coordination 
among agencies.57 The MCTF is a unit comprised of 163 agents and is   
responsible for investigating cases of high-level corruption.58 Unfortunately, 
  
 54 UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 5, 15, 43, 51.   
 55 FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 3–4.  
 56 See UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 5–14 (outlining the preventative measures and roles of 
public and private officials and institutions in preventing and fighting corruption).  
 57 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTRUCTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS 108 (Jan. 30, 2011) [hereinafter SIGAR REP’T], available at 
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2011-01-30qr.pdf (discussing the various Afghan 
bodies charged with implementing the Afghan anti-corruption movement and the progress 
that they have made).  
 58 Id. at 108–09. The MCTF receives logistical support from the FBI and mentoring sup-
port from the Department of Justice. According to the U.S. Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs, the MCTF is operating at 70% capacity. President Karzai 
undermined its credibility when he ordered that the task force be investigated for illegal 
activities and human rights violations following the arrest of one of his aides. Subsequently, 
two lead prosecutors involved in the investigation and arrest were transferred to a provincial 
office. Id.  
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the MCTF has little involvement in the education system and focuses   
largely on high-level officials in the national government: its investigations 
have led to very few prosecutions.59 Lastly, the ACU operates in the Afghan 
Attorney General’s Office and oversees prosecution of corruption cases.60 In 
the final quarter of 2010, the ACU secured eight convictions of mid-level 
officials, but it has not pursued prosecution of high-level government     
employees.61 In a clear sign of the government’s reluctance to rigorously 
root out corruption within its ranks, the Attorney General and the Afghan 
Supreme Court issued directives forbidding the use of polygraphs on newly 
hired anti-corruption officials.62 While the ACU hired fifty new prosecutors 
between July 2010 and January 2011, it did not subject any of these       
individuals to polygraph testing, and only five of the eleven judges on the 
Anti-Corruption Tribunal have taken and passed a polygraph examination.63 
In implementing each entity and its functions, Afghanistan has     
increasingly relied on UNCAC’s provisions. The Convention’s initial step 
in combating corruption is to establish a body to oversee all aspects of the 
anti-corruption program within a government.64 Likely out of fear that an 
anti-corruption body is susceptible to the same temptations that plague  
government officials and public employees, UNCAC requires the          
government to give to the body the necessary independence and freedom to 
carry out its broad array of tasks without undue influence.65 
In fulfilling this obligation, President Karzai created HOOAC, a 
promising organization designed to provide unifying oversight to           
coordinate, supervise, and support all anti-corruption programs within    
Afghanistan.66 The President appoints the top officer of HOOAC, the     
  
 59 Id. at 109.  
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. Until July 2010, officials from the U.S. Department of Justice provided full-time 
assistance to ACU prosecutors. However, this partnership was terminated in July because of 
efforts by Karzai to undermine the prosecution of a presidential aide. The DOJ has since 
reinstated the mentoring program, but is only permitted by the Afghan government to work 
on a limited number of mid-level cases. SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN 
RECONSTRUCTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 92–93 (July 
30, 2011), available at http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2011-07-30qr.pdf.  
 62 SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57, at 109.  
 63 Id.  
 64 UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 6, ¶ 1. 
 65 Id. art. 6, ¶. 2.,  
 66 HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIC 
PLAN: 2011–2013, at 6 (2010) [hereinafter HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN], available at https:// 
www.pksoi.org/document_repository/doc_lib/HOO_Anti-Corruption_Strategic_Plan_2011-
2013.pdf. In December 2010, HOOAC released a 60-page anti-corruption strategy detailing 
what it expects to accomplish by 2013. Id. This is a great start, but clearly missing from the 
strategy is an individualized approach to each Ministry. The MoE is only mentioned a hand-
ful of times, largely in regard to weaving anti-corruption education into the curriculum of 
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Director General.67 Its mandate includes oversight of all administrative and 
preventative measures against corruption undertaken by individual         
ministries, as well as investigation and prosecution of citizen complaints.68 
While HOOAC’s concept and goals are a significant start, more is          
necessary. HOOAC would do well to serve as an umbrella organization, 
perhaps coordinating all sectors in an anti-corruption strategy, as it is     
expected to do. However, combating the kind of corruption that is rampant 
in Afghanistan will not be accomplished by one large government oversight 
organization.69   
It is important to remember that Afghanistan is a society in which 
truckers pay bribes to get from Point A to Point B, citizens pay bribes to 
settle lawsuits, homeowners pay bribes to acquire the title to their home, 
and parents pay bribes to ensure passing grades for their children.           
Corruption is so entrenched and common that a single organization cannot 
be expected to oversee and reform the entire government, particularly when 
the organization is grossly understaffed and undertrained.70 The U.N. Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which provides assistance to member states 
on the implementation of their obligations under UNCAC, has        
acknowledged that HOOAC lacks key infrastructure, staffing, and technical 
assistance.71 Considering this acknowledgement alongside HOOAC’s broad, 
daunting mandate, HOOAC risks becoming obsolete. During its first year, 
  
primary and secondary schools. See, e.g., id. at 27, 47. A more narrow approach is necessary 
in the education system to achieve real and lasting progress.  
 67 Introduction: Who We Are?, HIGH OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT AND ANTI-CORRUPTION, 
http://anti-corruption.gov.af/en/page/1733 (last visited May 16, 2012).  
 68 See HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 19–26 (describing the policies, objec-
tives, and scope of the projects at HOOAC).  
 69 ISLAMIC REPUB. AFG., STRATEGY AND POLICY FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 7 (2009) [hereinafter SPACAR], available at http://anti-
corruption.gov.af/Content/files/ANTI%20CURAPTION%20STRATIGY_Eng.pdf (calling 
for more than just government oversight to fight corruption). Among a number of external 
factors blamed for facilitating corruption, “unsound performances of detection and investiga-
tion organizations” was identified as a primary reason Afghanistan’s culture of corruption 
remains so prevalent. The report noted that police and investigative agencies often delay or 
botch the process, then preventing the judicial system from sanctioning the perpetrator. Id. at 
85.  
 70 HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 12. HOOAC represents a shift from stop-
ping current corruption to deterring and preventing future corruption, and aims to do so by 
investigating individual corruption cases. Unfortunately, corruption is so rife that it occurs in 
almost every business transaction, so investigations by one organization would almost cer-
tainly go nowhere in the long run, as the demand would be too high to have an impact. Id. at 
14.  
 71 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Anti-Corruption Measures in Afghanistan 1 (un-
published Concept Note, Jan. 2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents 
/afghanistan//conceptnotes/Microsoft_Word_-_2010_11_April_01_Concept_Note_Anti-
Corruption.pdf [hereinafter UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures]. 
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HOOAC installed public drop boxes, established a hotline to collect com-
plaints, and assisted various ministries in the creation of their own anti-
corruption strategies.72 Nonetheless, perhaps in a sign that the organization 
is over-stretched, it led only one high-profile arrest and sent only fifteen 
cases to law-enforcement agencies.73 
Instead, Afghanistan should create a separate organization within 
the MoE to identify and focus on corruption as it occurs within that realm, 
unified under the umbrella organization of HOOAC and in cooperation with 
the other anti-corruption organizations.74 This would allow for a much   
narrower mandate, focusing only on corruption as it occurs in the education 
sector. Ideally, it should be a boots-on-the-ground, in-your-face              
organization that would publicly march against corruption. By becoming 
more involved than drop boxes and hotlines, the organization could more 
easily cater to the citizens and could establish a presence, hopefully        
diminishing the public’s acceptance of bribery and corrupt practices. A  
visible organization would almost certainly enhance pressure on those    
responsible and provide more transparency to those concerned. 
This organization must also be largely independent of government 
influence. A significant concern with HOOAC is that it reports directly to 
President Karzai, a man whom many believe contributes heavily to the 
worsening culture of corruption in Afghanistan.75 In response to             
  
 72 Ben Arnoldy, The Man Leading Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Fight, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Anti-Corruption Fight], http://www 
.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2009/1116/p06s07-wosc.html. HOOAC has also 
developed a system to seek out complaints and then distribute all information to the relevant 
ministry. While this is a good start, this is the exact type of on-the-ground operation that a 
smaller organization, focusing only on the education sector, should be conducting. It would 
allow for greater independence and establish conduits through which people may report 
corruption and receive immediate response, rather than filtering from HOOAC down to the 
MoE for further investigation. Even with HOOAC, the organization only collects complaints, 
leaving the ministries to address them and enforce any remedies, providing only an addition-
al unnecessary step and further bureaucracy. See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 
15 (discussing the split between HOOAC’s investigatory authority and the individual minis-
tries’ enforcement authorities).  
 73 Anti-Corruption Fight, supra note 72.  
 74 Though it might seem that HOOAC and the other organizations working together would 
be sufficient to combat corruption in the education system, it is not. All of the organizations 
are grossly untrained, understaffed, and unfunded, and they all are designed to root out the 
most common and blatant forms of corruption. Corruption that is unique to an individual 
ministry requires a more narrow and hands-on approach to focus on diminishing it within 
that realm. See, e.g., UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 71, at 3 (proposing 
further anti-corruption efforts focus on localized level).  
 75 See Adam Entous, Pentagon Puts Pressure on Hamid Karzai Over Corruption, 
REUTERS (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/29/us-afghanistan-usa-
mullen-idUSTRE62S0BG20100329 (describing U.S. efforts to convince Karzai to do more 
to fight corruption). Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was the top provincial official in 
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Afghanistan’s 2009 election fraud and renewed calls by the international 
community to confront corruption, Karzai has pledged to do just that.76 
However, there is also sufficient evidence to show that Karzai is merely 
giving lip service to an issue that has received increased attention,          
particularly as he has weakened anti-corruption investigations and condoned 
the culture of impunity in some instances.77 
The creation and goals of HOOAC are commendable and a strong 
first step. This body will lead the entire government in its anti-corruption 
agenda, but it should not be considered a silver bullet. A narrower approach 
to education would likely be more effective in Afghanistan. The creation of 
a body within the MoE would allow for a more customized approach to 
fighting corruption as it occurs in the education sector, and it would limit 
the scope of complaints, investigations, and prosecutions. 
The Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption 
(ICAC) is a good example of the type of comprehensive, independent, and 
successful organization that a MoE anti-corruption body should strive to 
become. When Hong Kong established the ICAC in 1974, corruption in 
Hong Kong was so widespread and accepted that many dismissed the new 
organization.78 However, the ICAC garnered almost-immediate legitimacy 
after the prosecution of 247 government officials.79 While Afghanistan and 
  
Kandahar and considered by many to be the cause of much corruption, particularly related to 
the opium trade. American officials have anonymously spoken out against Wali Karzai, 
going as far as saying U.S. interests would rather him be out of the government. Id. After the 
initial writing of this Note, Ahmad Wali Karzai was assassinated in July 2011 by a longtime 
confidant. Alissa J. Rubin & Scott Shane, Assassination in Afghanistan Creates a Void, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A1.  
 76 UNODC Anti-Corruption Measures, supra note 71, at 1. In his second inaugural speech, 
Karzai pledged his commitment to fight corruption and end the culture of impunity. He also 
created HOOAC, tasked the body to organize national anti-corruption conferences, and or-
dered all government ministries to perform their own anti-corruption strategies. Id. While 
this has been completed by the MoE, the draft is currently under review and has not yet been 
released. MoE Drafts Policy, supra note 2.  
 77 See Richard Spencer, Karzai Seeks to Weaken Anti-Corruption Investigations in Af-
ghanistan, TELEGRAPH, (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/ 
afghanistan/7991297/Karzai-seeks-to-weaken-anti-corruption-investigations-in-Afghanistan. 
html. After the United States invested more resources into assisting anti-corruption investiga-
tions, including teams from the FBI and Treasury Department, Karzai insisted on less in-
volvement by foreign officials and more local Afghan control, a move critics say weakens 
the investigations and relies solely on inept or unwilling officials. Id.  
 78 See Tony Kwok Man-Wai, Formulating an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy: The 
Experience of Hong Kong ICAC, in ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2005 AND RESOURCE MATERIAL 
SERIES NO. 69, at 196 (2006) (noting that few people in Hong Kong believed ICAC would be 
successful).  
 79 Id. In 2000, Hong Kongers ranked the creation and success of ICAC as the sixth most 
important event in Hong Kong history. Id. In 2010, the Transparency International Corrup-
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Hong Kong differ significantly, there are still similarities and lessons to be 
learned from the creation and implementation of such a successful          
organization. Most importantly, in both countries corruption is—or was—
systemic, both at the highest levels of government and throughout the    
system.80 In Hong Kong, police officers were regarded as the largest part of 
the problem, whereas in Afghanistan, teachers and MoE administrators are 
often to blame. 
To accomplish its mandate, ICAC has three overarching depart-
ments: (1) Operations, (2) Corruption Prevention, and (3) Community    
Relations.81 The Operations Department exposes and investigates corruption 
through the use of undercover operations and complaint follow-up. ICAC 
receives complaints through a report center and hotline number, and an 
ICAC agent investigates each complaint and has authority to arrest suspects 
upon evidence that a corrupt transaction has occurred.82 
ICAC’s Corruption Prevention Department is charged with    
providing anti-corruption recommendations and conducting studies to    
determine where the corruption is most active and harmful.83 By law, 
ICAC’s Commissioner must relay his or her findings from the studies to 
public sector organizations, and he or she must make recommendations on 
the effective implementation of corruption prevention mechanisms to both 
public organizations and to any requesting member of the public.84 
Lastly, ICAC’s Community Relations Department is responsible for 
educating the public about the evils of corruption.85 One of the most critical 
functions of an oversight body is the enhancement of transparency  
throughout the government and individual ministries, from conducting   
corruption investigations to providing education statistics and financial data. 
UNCAC refers several times to the importance of transparency, particularly 
in allowing the public to see and participate in the decision-making        
  
tion Perception Index ranked Hong Kong as the 13th best country (13 out of 178) with an 
Index score of 8.4. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 36.  
 80 JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, INT’L BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., ANTI-CORRUPTION 
COMMISSIONS: PANACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION? 3 (2004).  
 81 Presentation by Andrew H.Y. Wong, Dir. of Admin., ICAC, Anti-Corruption Strategy 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Dec. 
2003), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan 
019145.pdf. 
 82 INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION GOV’T, HONG KONG: THE 
FACTS: ICAC (Apr. 2011). Between its creation in 1974 and the end of 2010, ICAC received 
108,389 corruption complaints, conducted 70,511 investigations, and prosecuted 13,808 
persons. Id. 
 83 Id.  
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
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processes of government.86 This could range from publicizing funding and 
tracking where money goes, to publicizing the names of those officials 
caught soliciting bribes or otherwise engaging in corrupt business        
transactions. Corruption thrives in secrecy; maximizing transparency where 
possible can only serve to deter corruption. 
ICAC’s Community Relations Department not only disseminates 
anti-corruption messages to the public, but it also is tasked with ensuring 
that ICAC remains a transparent and responsive organization, which it   
accomplishes largely through the use of an ICAC website and various   
training programs intended to encourage integrity among civil servants.87 
Afghanistan can take similar measures. While many anti-corruption       
programs aim to educate the public on the negative consequences of       
corruption, the MoE has firsthand access to a key demographic: children. 
The MoE anti-corruption body should work to communicate with the     
general public through training programs, seminars, and mass media, but it 
should also incorporate anti-corruption lessons and discussions into the  
general school curriculum. When corruption is as common and destructive 
as it is in Afghanistan, educating children against it is a critical objective. 
A key difference between HOOAC and ICAC—and a critical factor 
in the success of the organizations—is the number of staff members. ICAC 
has a staff of almost 1,400.88 By comparison, HOOAC’s Complaints    
Management and Review, Prevention, and Community Relations            
departments have a total of sixty-five positions, thirty-three of which are 
currently vacant.89 Though HOOAC’s structure is similar to that of ICAC, it 
is vastly understaffed and lacks the resources it needs to achieve ICAC-type 
success. Instead, the smaller MoE anti-corruption body should be created 
with a similar structure. Its focused mandate would allow it to operate on a 
smaller budget with fewer agents. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, ICAC is successful because 
of its independent structure.90 Collectively, the departments answer to a 
Commissioner who in turn answers directly to the Chief Executive of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.91 Most critical, however, are the 
checks and balances that are incorporated into the system. Five independent 
committees closely scrutinize the ICAC, each consisting of leading and non-
  
 86 UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, 10, 13 (emphasizing transparency in public sector ser-
vices, public reporting, and in dealings with society).  
 87 INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 82.  
 88 Id. 
 89 See HOOAC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 66, at 20, 24, 27 (providing the number of 
people on staff and number of vacancies for each department).  
 90 See INFO. SERVS. DEP’T, supra note 82 (stating that ICAC is independent of the civil 
service and describing the independent committees that oversee ICAC’s work).  
 91 Id.  
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official citizens: the Advisory Committee on Corruption advises on    
Commission-wide policies and issues; the Operations Review Committee 
monitors all ICAC investigations; the Corruption Prevention Advisory 
Committee supervises the Commission’s efforts to improve practices and 
procedures; the Citizens Advisory Committee on Community Relations 
supervises and makes recommendations regarding ICAC’s engagement with 
the public; and the Complaints Committee examines public complaints 
against ICAC and its staff.92 With so many different and independent bodies 
overseeing the operation of ICAC, its independence is assured. The MoE’s 
anti-corruption body must take similar steps to ensure its integrity and    
dedication to anti-corruption efforts. Unless it establishes a comprehensive 
system of checks and balances, the body risks becoming another puppet of 
the already corrupt government. 
One risk associated with creating a smaller, more focused            
organization is the competition for funds and coordination—or lack of—that 
might occur between the smaller organization and the HOOAC. Funding is 
discussed below, but the advantages of an organization, most notably the 
corruption-related investigations within only the MoE, outweigh the     
complications caused by the additional agency. Ultimately, the organization 
could save money by more specifically targeting anti-corruption efforts to 
achieve the desired results within the MoE. 
Outside of an administrative anti-corruption body, the Convention 
also requires Afghanistan to maintain and strengthen systems for recruiting, 
hiring, and retaining civil servants, including teachers.93 The Convention 
aims not just to attack corruption as it occurs, but it also tries to remedy the 
root causes of corruption. 
Central to any anti-corruption mechanism is the notion that self-
interested individuals will seek out and accept bribes, and that they will 
engage in corrupt business practices if the expected gains outweigh the  
potential costs.94 The Afghan government could influence this cost-benefit 
consideration by promoting adequate remuneration and equitable pay 
scales.95 Much has been made of Afghanistan’s teachers’ low salaries—
some of the lowest in the world—along with paychecks being late and   
officials bribed for teachers to receive them. Confronting the issue of  
teacher payment is more complex than it may seem. 
  
 92 Id. 
 93 UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, ¶ 1. The Convention also notes that these systems should 
be based on efficiency, transparency, merit, equity, and aptitude. Id.  
 94 Jeff Huther & Anwar Shah, Anti-Corruption Policies and Programs: A Framework for 
Evaluation 3 (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2501, 2000).  
 95 See UNCAC, supra note 53, art. 7, ¶ 1(c) (presenting pay scales as a means to strength-
en accountability among public officials). 
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First and foremost, Afghanistan must increase teacher salaries over 
the next several years. The MoE has begun this process by increasing     
salaries from $100 per month to a range of $120 to $428 per month, and it is 
critical that this pay raise continue for several reasons.96 To start, teachers 
making more money will not have to rely as heavily on bribes to feed their 
families and to make ends meet. Further, the higher the relative salaries for 
teachers, the more he or she risks losing if caught engaging in corruption, 
and low salaries in the public sector tend to attract lower-level applicants, 
resulting in less competent employees.97 Additionally, teachers comprise 
two-thirds of the civil servants in Afghanistan; when teachers are paid well 
and happy, they translate that success to their students and promote respect 
for and understanding of the law. And when civil servants are paid very 
little, the moral cost of corruption is reduced; poorly paid teachers might 
find it less reprehensible to accept bribes.98 This is particularly true in    
Afghanistan, where there is very little, if any, moral condemnation in     
requesting or paying a bribe. 
Second, education needs to be professionalized. In 2010, the MoE 
took significant steps in doing so by opening forty-two teacher-training  
colleges throughout the country.99 This program not only certifies and    
registers teachers, but also serves as an anti-corruption mechanism by   
promoting a more professional work environment and adhering to a strict 
code of conduct. This process will immediately cut down on the number of 
ghost teachers and allow the MoE to more accurately allocate funds and 
resources to the villages and provinces in need. With the increased number 
of teachers and a more professionalized work environment, the MoE will 
also be able to raise its hiring standards.100 
  
 96 Arnoldy, supra note 26. The pay scale is based on the teacher’s level of education and 
their score on a national standardized test. Unfortunately, limited funding has hampered the 
government’s efforts to increase teacher pay and international donors have been reluctant to 
contribute because of the problems arising from corruption, lack of security, etc. Id.  
 97 CHR. MICHELSEN INST., CORRUPTION IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR 10 (2006). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Press Release, ISAF Pub. Affairs Office, Progress in Afghanistan Highlighted by Busi-
ness Growth, Job Creation and New Infrastructure Projects (Nov. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.centcom.mil/press-releases/progress-in-afghanistan-highlighted-by-business-
growth-job-creation-and-new-infrastructure-projects. The training colleges offer certification 
programs to certify Afghans as professional teachers. This is a substantial step toward im-
proving teacher quality throughout the country. As of late 2010, these colleges had graduated 
more than 123,000 teachers from the short-term course and another 20,000 from the teacher-
in-training two-year program. Sgt. Shawn Coolman, Lashkar Gah TTC Educates Future 
Afghan Teachers, DVIDS NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.dvidshub.net/news/57732/ lash-
kar-gah-ttc-educates-future-afghan-teachers#.T7XJp3lYtuQ. 
100 Arnoldy, supra note 26. Understandably, shortly after the fall of the Taliban, teachers 
were in such dire need that the MoE could not afford to set high standards. However, as the 
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Another step the MoE can take is the development of direct deposit 
systems that will allow a teacher’s paycheck to be deposited directly into a 
bank account. A World Bank working policy paper argues that reducing the 
number of transactions involving public officials is a significant mechanism 
in influencing cost-benefit considerations and reducing corruption.101 Direct 
deposit systems would immediately achieve this by not only cutting down 
the time it takes to send the money, but also reducing the number of hands 
that have access to the money. One common problem with this approach, 
however, is that many teachers, particularly those in rural and distant     
villages, do not have easy access to a bank.102 In 2009, the MoE instituted a 
new system requiring some teachers to register, open a bank account, and 
take a competency test.103 Without a doubt, there are problems with this 
method, particularly because many teachers lack easy access to banks. But 
despite these problems, this type of system should be instituted throughout 
the country, as it would allow the Ministry to collect data, distribute     
payment more easily, and weed out unqualified teachers.104 These types of 
preventative measures would allow the MoE to crack down on ghost   
teachers and more effectively provide resources—financial and otherwise—
to teachers and schools throughout the country. 
B.  Criminalization: Finally Enforcing the Laws 
Criminalization is the second pillar of UNCAC.105 The Convention 
requires states to criminalize the offering or giving of a bribe to a public 
  
system continues to develop, the MoE can begin implementing more appropriate standards, 
including education requirements, mandatory training classes, registration systems, etc. Id. 
101 Huther & Shah, supra note 94, 3–4. The other mechanisms include reducing the scope 
for gains from each transaction, increasing the probability of paying a penalty, and increasing 
the penalty from corrupt behavior. Id.  
102 Daiyar, supra note 47. On his blog, one journalist wrote of the problems many teachers 
have faced. Because many are “untrained and non-professional,” he said, they have no bank 
account and often find themselves traveling long distances to get to the bank before waiting 
all day to open an account and receive their paycheck. Id.  
103 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 19, 41. The Ministry’s goal was to establish 
teacher in-service training throughout the country by attaining a 70% competency rating for 
all teachers by the end of 2011. Mohammed Haneef Atmar, Minister of Education, Education 
Sector Strategy for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1 (Ministry of Educ., 
Draft, Mar. 2007). 
104 See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 19 (detailing a new project to ensure 
teachers are uniformly qualified). The Office of Social Sector Development is also working 
with the MoE to develop a teacher registration database and more uniform recruitment prac-
tices. Additionally, the Capacity Development Project is working with the MoE to develop 
forgery proof paper for the printing of authentic diplomas. Id. 
105 See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 15–44 (providing for the criminalization of 
acts of corruption and necessary law enforcement mechanisms).  
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official and the solicitation or acceptance of a bribe by a public official, 
which Afghanistan has done.106 However, corruption is so widespread and 
accepted that merely criminalizing it is not a complete solution. For       
example, wealthier citizens often bribe police officers and judges, avoiding 
any criminal sanctions and only serving to enhance the problem.107 For   
Afghanistan’s anti-corruption agenda to be successful, it must bridge the 
gap between prevention and law enforcement. This stage is critical and 
should include a strong up-front component to establish credibility         
immediately. 
Afghanistan’s current anti-corruption legislation is based on the  
Afghan Constitution, UNCAC, the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS), and the Strategy and Policy for Anti-Corruption and  
Administrative Reform (SPACAR).108 Unfortunately, Afghanistan’s laws, 
investigative procedures, and enforcement regulations overlap and are    
difficult to decipher.109 In December 2010, the Director-General of 
HOOAC, Mohammad Yasin Osmani, announced that the Afghan           
government was working to further revise the country’s anti-corruption laws 
to better comply with UNCAC.110 
ANDS and SPACAR require the government to focus on reducing 
administrative corruption by increasing monitoring, introducing additional 
programs to limit the risk of corruption, and enhancing public interaction 
and complaint capabilities.111 Both focus on the underlying causes of      
  
106 Id. art. 15(a)–(b).  
107 UN Afghanistan Survey Points to Huge Scale of Bribery, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.c o.uk / 2/hi/8466915.stm.  
108 See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 16–18 (outlining the current legal 
foundation in Afghanistan); see also FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 2–3. Article 7 
of the Afghan Constitution requires the country’s laws to comply with its international obli-
gations and treaties; Article 75 states the government has the duty to “[maintain] public law 
and order and elimination of administrative corruption;” and Article 142 requires the national 
government to establish the necessary departments to comply with all provisions of the Con-
stitution. Though it is rare for a constitution to explicitly discuss corruption, Afghanistan’s 
Constitution does not go into any depth or provide a framework for the government to com-
bat corruption in any way. CONST. OF AFG. 1392, available at http://www.afghan-web.com/ 
politics/current_constitution.html. 
109 See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 15–18 (describing the many offices 
involved with anti-corruption effort). Currently, complaints regarding corruption are collect-
ed at HOOAC or the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (corruption falls 
under AIHRC’s mandate because it violates human rights). Complaints then must be sorted 
to go to the individual ministries, the Attorney General’s Office, or the Afghan National 
Police in the Ministry of Interior (all of which are extraordinarily corrupt in and of them-
selves). The National Directorate of Security, responsible for countering organized crime, 
also gathers information and refers it to the Attorney General. Id. 
110 SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57, at 108.  
111 FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at 2.  
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corruption and advocate for programs and institutional changes outside of 
criminalization to transform the perception of corruption and mitigate its 
impact. 
Still, SPACAR comprehensively details many of the current        
deficiencies in the governmental framework for combating corruption, and 
it outlines steps to be taken by different government agencies to correct 
these deficiencies. However, it also acknowledges that “current laws and 
regulations, whether they are previous, translated or new, sometimes do not 
conform to the administrative conditions in the country and causes different 
types of corruption and chaos in the work process.”112 In the education   
system specifically, SPACAR provides little guidance, only requiring the 
MoE to include constitutional law for all students in 7th grade and higher, 
develop a more efficient system for busing students to school, promote  
respect for the justice system, create more transparent procedures for      
procurement and construction contracts, and standardize the curriculum and 
student forms to allow employers to more easily and accurately identify 
students’ qualifications.113 
Despite the lack of specificity regarding MoE anti-corruption     
programs, SPACAR does offer a number of improvements regarding     
Afghanistan’s general anti-corruption strategy that will benefit all anti-
corruption programs.114 Among these are the recommendations for higher 
wages for public employees,115 an increased focus on standards of          
professionalism in the public sector,116 new regulations requiring police and 
judicial officials to abide by the law when arresting and sentencing         
individuals rather than letting individuals off because of connections or the 
  
112 SPACAR, supra note 69, at 60.  
113 Id. at 64. Interestingly, though SPACAR does not specifically discuss corruption in the 
education sector, it does touch on a number of individual sectors, including courts, health, 
transportation, logging, and mining. See generally id.  
114 See, e.g., id. at 27, 34– 54, 114– 17 (proposing standards for regulating the influence of 
personal relationship, professionalism in the workforce, and government contracting).  
115 See id. at 53 (“The salary and retirement allowances for employees should be stabilized 
and approved justifiably, this way employees will never prefer another job over than their 
current job due to lack of salary.”). 
116 See id. at 90. 
The authorities of the Supreme Court should make an assessment of the qualifica-
tions, experience and competence of the judicial professional staff, both in the cen-
ter and as well as in the provinces, and should take legal steps in regard to judges 
and judicial staff whose employment is in contradiction with judicial rules and reg-
ulations. 
Id. 
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ability to pay a bribe,117 and provisions promoting accountability within the 
government.118 
While these provisions are beneficial, it is necessary to go further. 
Criminalizing the payment and receipt of a bribe will help by punishing the 
activity, but it is important to have additional punitive measures available. If 
every person who requested, received, offered or paid a bribe were jailed or 
fined for their crime, then many—if not most—of the country’s inhabitants 
would be imprisoned and bankrupt. Additionally, there is concern that with 
the influx of corruption cases, Afghanistan’s courts would be unable to  
handle the increased workload. The U.S. Department of Justice is currently 
working with Afghan courts and the Anti-Corruption Tribunal to increase 
their efficiency and effectiveness when dealing with these cases.119       
However, it could also serve the MoE well to have internal sanctions      
outside of the court system. For example, the MoE and its anti-corruption 
body should consider alternative punishments, including non-penal       
sanctions, to punish and condemn the behavior. These measures could   
include a fine, but they should also include more creative techniques,     
including public censure in the local media, transfer to a different school, or 
unpaid suspension for a number of days.120 Theoretically, a teacher who is 
publicly reprimanded for requesting a bribe from one student would be 
more reluctant to continue requesting bribes from other students. While 
monetary sanctions are often successful, Afghanistan’s traditional village 
hierarchy makes it less likely that some students will report teachers. For 
this reason, the Afghan government should continue to educate the public 
  
117 See id. at 69 (“The Police must be rewarded in accordance with Their [sic] every good 
and acceptable action, which shows their devotion and self-sacrifice, and must be legally 
prosecuted for every bad action. Paying no attention the implementation of reward and pun-
ishment principles, shows the administration is not giving good over site [sic].”) 
118 See SPACAR, supra note 69, at 22 (“If such job recommendations and Wastas (connec-
tions) are not prevented, the opportunity for transparency and accountability to prevent cor-
ruption will never be provided.”). 
119 See generally SIGAR REP’T, supra note 57 (detailing the relationship between the Unit-
ed States and Afghanistan in this capacity). 
120 Cf. Jamie Sarrio, State Panel to Consider Lighter Punishment for Educators Who Coop-
erated in Cheating Probe, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.ajc.com/news/ 
atlanta/state-panel-to-consider-1161669.html. 
Commissioners, relying extensively on evidence from the state investigation, will 
look into each case and decide over the next few months whether the educators 
named in the report are guilty of cheating or other ethical violations. Those found 
guilty could face sanctions ranging from a reprimand to loss of a teaching license.  
Id. Suspending a teacher could cause quite a dilemma, as it would leave a number of students 
unable to attend school or require them to work with another teacher. However, suspensions 
could be more appropriate for students and officials within the Ministry, as it would serve as 
immediate punishment but could also serve to embarrass among peers, and thus as a future 
deterrent.   
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and embarrass those caught engaging in corruption, making the act morally 
reprehensible and creating an additional deterrent. 
Additionally, keeping the investigation, prosecution, and            
punishment solely within the MoE would allow the anti-corruption body to 
see the case through to its resolution. In doing so, it would prevent further 
corruption in the courtroom and would ensure that justice is done in each 
case. As discussed above, Afghanistan’s justice system is not known for its 
integrity, but keeping cases inside the MoE would mitigate the potential for 
additional corruption once a case goes to the courts and would presumably 
lessen the expense and time to complete a case. There is a point, however, at 
which only so much can be done, and the MoE would need to set clear lines 
for when cases shall be bound over to the court system for more severe  
punishment. 
C.   International Cooperation: Joining Forces to Fight Corruption 
International cooperation is the third pillar of UNCAC.121 This    
section requires parties to assist each other in criminal matters and to     
provide “the widest measure of mutual legal assistance” in investigations, 
prosecutions, and judicial proceedings.122 
Afghanistan is at an interesting point in its history and has a unique 
opportunity to take advantage of the international presence within its      
borders. If it chooses to do so, Afghanistan can benefit from unprecedented 
international collaboration, which would provide the country with logistical 
and mentoring support on issues ranging from security to mining           
technology to development projects. Years from now, Afghanistan could be 
the model for experts to look to when developing international cooperation 
strategies because of the vast number of organizations willing to provide 
assistance. Currently, international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations are providing assistance with anti-corruption strategies, from 
drafting legislation to aiding investigations to furthering education.123 For 
example, an American multi-agency group based at the U.S. Embassy in 
Kabul, Afghanistan has drafted an additional anti-corruption strategy for the 
Afghan government to improve transparency and accountability.124 Despite 
the international presence, Afghan citizens must own the anti-corruption 
  
121 See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 43–49 (detailing the role of international 
cooperation in anti-corruption efforts).  
122 Id. arts. 43, 46. The Convention also has a significant section detailing extraditions and 
transfers between state parties. Id. arts. 44, 45.  
123 See CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 1–2 (listing the U.S. agencies currently 
pursuing anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan).  
124 FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at ii. This strategy has not yet been approved by 
the U.S. State Department. Id. 
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agenda; without political and moral will, no anti-corruption plan can      
succeed. However, international organizations and individuals can play key 
roles in this development.125 
To do so, however, it is important for U.S. and European agencies 
to work alongside Afghan officials in investigating and prosecuting Afghans 
at all levels, including those in President Karzai’s national government. 
Following the arrest of one of his aides, President Karzai introduced       
legislation allowing only Afghan investigators to make decisions regarding 
corruption cases.126 In response, President Obama met with his national  
security advisors in mid-September 2010 to formulate new ways to combat 
corruption in Karzai’s administration.127 In January, the Obama               
administration announced that the U.S. government would no longer pursue 
top Afghan officials, conceding that “limited judicial capacity and political 
pressure” make prosecution nearly impossible.128 Though this would      
undermine the application and legitimacy of some anti-corruption measures, 
  
125 Many governments and NGOs are currently providing assistance with anti-corruption 
initiatives. For example, USAID has conducted comprehensive reviews regarding the extent 
of corruption within Afghanistan and the country’s current anti-corruption laws. See general-
ly CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29. In addition, they have provided assistance with 
various programs, including the printing of diplomas on forgery-proof paper. Id. at 19. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided expertise and assistance with anti-corruption 
investigations and prosecutions, and international legal experts have provided guidance to 
ensure that Afghanistan’s laws comply with UNCAC and achieve the stated goals. Id. at 20, 
32. 
126 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai Seeks to Limit Role of U.S. Corruption Investigators , 
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/ 
09/08/AR2010090805935_pf.html. An Afghan task force that received financing, training, 
equipment, and intelligence from the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement agencies made the 
arrest of Karzai’s aide. Following Karzai’s statement, advisors from the U.S. Department of 
Justice temporarily suspended their work with the Afghan anti-corruption unit. While there is 
concern among the Obama administration that the American assistance is creating a rift with 
Karzai, one U.S. official hinted at the importance of the investigations to the Afghan public, 
saying, “The Afghans want to see their leaders held to account. They don’t want these cases 
swept under the rug.” Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Karzai Rift Prompts U.S. to Reevaluate Anti-
Corruption Strategy in Afghanistan, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. to 
Reevaluate], http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/12/AR201009 
1203883.html.  
127 U.S. to Reevaluate, supra note 126. In addition to calling for new legislation, Karzai 
intervened and ordered his aide, Mohammad Zia Salehi, released from custody. The Afghan 
government subsequently dropped all charges against Salehi. Warren P. Strobel & Marisa 
Taylor, U.S. Won’t Pursue Karzai Allies in Anti-Corruption Campaign, MCCLATCHY 
NEWSPAPERS (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/01/06/106314/afghan-anti-
corruption-plan-sidesteps.html.   
128 Strobel & Taylor, supra note 127. The strategy does not completely rule out pursuing 
top Afghan officials, saying the U.S. government may be compelled to act unilaterally if the 
Afghan government fails to act by freezing officials’ assets or limiting travel to the United 
States. Id.  
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it is a practical resolution: pursuing President Karzai’s allies would be   
fruitless and would only serve to frustrate the current partnership between 
the U.S. and Afghan government. Instead, Obama’s new anti-corruption 
plan targets corruption at the local level and fortifies Afghan institutions.129 
This strategy could be very successful in the MoE, as many of the          
individuals engaging in corruption in the education sector are low-level 
officials and civil servants whom the Afghan government will not protect. 
Afghanistan is sovereign and reserves the right to make its own   
decisions regarding corruption, but it is critical at this stage that U.S. and 
other international agencies be permitted to assist in these lower-level    
investigations and prosecutions. Not only would this allow Afghanistan to 
use more modern techniques, but also it would assure a level of credibility 
and accountability that might otherwise be absent in an all-Afghan         
organization. Additionally, foreign agencies could provide the necessary 
manpower required until the MoE’s anti-corruption body can fully recruit 
and train its own anti-corruption agents. 
Although Afghan officials will largely decide the extent of any     
international assistance, the international community could take direct steps 
to influence President Karzai’s decisions. The most obvious and effective 
technique would be to withhold aid, both monetary and otherwise. If     
President Karzai or MoE officials were to refuse to allow American law 
enforcement agencies to assist—as they have—the clearest condemnation 
the Obama administration could convey would be to withhold money. Since 
2002, the U.S. government has allocated roughly $50 billion for             
reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan; an additional $20 billion has been 
pledged.130 In the past decade, the education sector has received 9% of the 
total aid, but that number has decreased with respect to just the past seven 
years, for which education has received the least amount of aid of any   
government sector.131 With a decrease in provided aid, it might seem unwise 
to discontinue funding, particularly for education. 
However, numerous studies, including the Azimi Report, which was 
produced by the Inter-Institutional Commission on Corruption, have found 
that the unprecedented large inflows of international assistance have led to 
pressures to commit and spend the money quickly and have greatly        
  
129 Id. The plan states: “The goals of this strategy are to strengthen Afghan institutions to 
provide checks on government power, to positively influence the behavior of corrupt offi-
cials, and to tackle visible corruption (especially at the local level) so that the Afghan people 
can see that change is happening.” Id.  
130 FINALIZED STRATEGY, supra note 52, at ii. 
131 Id. The infrastructure/natural resources and agriculture sectors received the most aid, 
with 24% and 18% respectively. Governance, operating budget assistance, economic govern-
ance, social protection, education, and health complete the remaining sectors in descending 
order of aid provided. Id.  
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increased the opportunities for corruption.132 Withholding funds not only 
limits the amount of money that can be corruptly distributed, but it also  
encourages the government to ensure that the money is used as effectively 
as possible. With so many funds disappearing or prices rising because of 
corruption, the continuing inflow of significant financial assistance will 
only continue to feed a corrupt system. 
Most recently, in a course-changing and risky move, the Obama 
administration’s anti-corruption strategy pledged not to withhold funds, but 
to funnel hundreds of millions of dollars directly to individual ministries 
and municipalities.133 While this plan circumvents the extra hand of the  
Afghan national government, it could be effective if the money is carefully 
distributed and monitored. In addition to money donated to the MoE for the 
funding of teachers, school buildings, and books, the U.S. government and 
international allies should ensure that a substantial portion flows to the   
independent anti-corruption body to continue uncovering corruption within 
the Ministry. To satisfy governmental and non-governmental donors,     
Afghanistan and its international partners should simplify the auditing    
procedures within each Ministry and sector, ensuring that all money is   
accounted for. Any anti-corruption plan that continues to fund development 
projects will likely fail if it does not also strengthen anti-corruption        
organizations responsible for monitoring those projects and ministries.134 
D.  Asset Recovery: The Cost of Corruption 
Asset recovery is the final pillar of UNCAC.135 Theoretically, this 
provision requires the government to confiscate corrupt funds from the  
perpetrator and to return those funds to their rightful owner. It relies on the 
notion that anti-corruption reform will succeed if it can create a widespread 
sense of justice and the faith that corruption does not pay. In order to      
succeed, the fruits of the crime must be taken away and returned to the 
rightful party. 
However, the type of corruption that is occurring within the         
education sector is not as sophisticated or severe as the Convention seems to 
intend. For example, UNCAC requires that a state “[t]ake such measures as 
  
132 CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT, supra note 29, at 5. 
133 Strobel & Taylor, supra note 127. 
134 Should it strengthen its auditing policies, Afghanistan would also likely benefit from 
increased donor aid from non-governmental organizations, as many organizations remain 
reluctant to donate out of a fear that the money will be re-distributed or “lost.” Aunohita 
Mojumdar, Afghanistan: Donor Funding Missing Mark, EURASIANET (Dec. 28, 2010), 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62640.  
135 See generally UNCAC, supra note 53, arts. 51–59. This aspect of the Convention is 
considered a breakthrough in the international anti-corruption field, but is not particularly 
applicable to the MoE.  
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may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to give effect to an 
order of confiscation issued by a court of another State Party…”136 But   
international corruption is not the type of corruption that the education   
sector is wrought with. When a teacher demands a bribe, the student’s fami-
ly pays the bribe and there is little involvement with banks, a network of 
people, or international connections. 
Afghanistan should ensure that its laws and regulations comply with 
UNCAC, but the sophistication of the Convention’s asset-recovery         
provisions require do not apply to all forms of corruption in Afghanistan, 
particularly within the MoE.137 Because of this, Afghanistan should focus on 
requiring repayment of bribes in the criminalization aspect of its reform, 
ensuring that part of the punishment for bribery includes returning the 
funds. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The detrimental effects of corruption on the education sector in   
Afghanistan are vast, overwhelming, and discouraging. But they are     
problems that a society—particularly one that has been in the midst of   
conflict for the better part of fifty years—should expect to face. The steps 
that Afghanistan has already taken in the education sector are encouraging. 
From increasing teacher salaries and implementing direct-deposit systems, 
to more comprehensive and rigorous information gathering, investigation, 
and prosecution of corruption, Afghanistan’s MoE has and must continue to 
make progress in the months and years ahead. However, for any real change 
to occur, national and MoE officials must be willing to commit significant 
resources to the recruitment and training of individuals to fill a narrowly 
focused and highly visible MoE anti-corruption body. 
Corruption in Afghanistan will never disappear, just as it will never 
be eradicated in any country. However, Afghanistan can reduce corruption 
to a manageable level by working with the international community. When 
that happens, the education system will become stronger, as will the rest of 
Afghanistan. 
  
136 Id. art. 54, ¶ 1(a).   
137 The UNCAC’s asset recovery provisions apply more appropriately to international 
actors working within the state, specifically NGOs and government contractors.  
